Should Public Capital Be Subsidized or Provided? by Shantayanan Devarajan et al.









∗We would like to thank Jess Benhabib, William Chan, Bill Easterly, Ross Levine,
Chong Yip and Shlomo Yitzhaki for useful comments.
†Mailing Address: Policy Research Department, World Bank, Room N10-049, 1818 H
St, NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA.Abstract
In an endogenous-growth model, we consider alternative ways of providing
public capital using distortionary taxes. We show that if the government
provides the good, the resulting growth rate and welfare may or may not
be higher than under laissez-faire. By contrast, if the government subsidizes
private providers, not only are growth and welfare higher than under public
provision, they are also unambiguously higher than under laissez-faire.
21 Introduction
The early literature on endogenous-growth models (Romer 1986 and Lucas
1988) showed that, when there are stocks that generate positive externalities
(knowledge, human capital, infrastructure capital), the government can in-
crease the economy’s growth rate by intervening to internalize the externality.
This literature assumed that the government had access to lump-sum taxes to
ﬁnance the intervention. The more recent literature (Barro 1990) has looked
at situations where the government uses distortionary taxes. However, this
literature does not model the underlying rationale for public intervention.
Rather, they assume that government spending is productive by including it
as an argument in the aggregate production function.
If the reason for public intervention is an externality, the solution need
not be government provision of the good; it could be a subsidy to private
providers. The purpose of this paper is to examine alternative forms of pro-
viding these so-called “public capital” goods using distortionary taxes where
the externality associated with public capital is explicitly taken into account.
In section 2, we set up a two-capital endogenous-growth model in which type
1 capital has no externality but type 2 has a positive externality. In section
3, we analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium in a special version of the model,
deriving the long-run rate of growth of output. By laissez-faire, we mean that
all capital formation is done by private individuals and the government plays
no role. In section 4, we analyze the equilibrium under two popular kinds
3of government intervention, namely (1) the government’s taking over type 2
capital formation; and (2) subsidizing private type 2 capital formation. In
section 5, we compare the welfare and growth rates of the various cases. We
show that with public provision, welfare and the growth rate of output may
or may not be higher than under laissez-faire, since the distortionary costs
of taxation may outweigh the beneﬁts of capturing the positive externality.
With the subsidy, however, not only are welfare and the growth rate higher
than with public provision (because the former requires less of the distor-
tionary tax) but it is also unambiguously higher than under laissez-faire.
Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider an economy with an inﬁnitely-lived representative agent. His pref-





where ρ is the discount factor (0 < ρ < 1) and u(ct) is increasing and concave
in ct, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.









t is type 1 capital stock in a representative ﬁrm; k2
t is type 2 capital
stock in the representative ﬁrm. The positive externality generated by type
2 capital is captured by an increasing function, e(ˆ k2
t), where ˆ k2
t is the average
4of type 2 capital stock in the economy. Accumulation of the two types of
capital goods is given by
k1
t+1 = yt +( 1− δ1)k1
t − ct − zt
k2
t+1 = zt +( 1− δ2)k2
t,
(1)
where δ1 and δ2 are the rates of depreciation in type 1 and type 2 capital
goods, respectively, and zt is investment in type 2 capital.
This completes the basic setup. In the next two sections, we character-
ize the benchmark case (laissez-faire) and the two scenarios outlined in the
introduction by solving some dynamic optimization problems. We will use
a special example which delivers an explicit solution and makes transparent
the comparison of long-run growth rates and welfare.
3 The Benchmark Case: Laissez-Faire
In this section, we analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium in a special version
of the model. We adopt a utility function and production function that
permit an explicit solution. Speciﬁcally, the pair consists of a log utility
and the Cobb-Douglas production function, which is a special case of the
pairs studied in Benhabib and Rustichini (1994). For pairs of utility and
production functions that allow for explicit dynamics in a continuous time
framework, see Xie (1991) and Xie (1994).
5To ﬁx ideas, we specify in detail the functional forms in this example.









where α ∈ (0,1), β ∈ (0,1) and α + β < 1. The functional form for the
externality term is speciﬁed in such a way that long-run growth is possible
(see Lucas 1988 and Romer 1990).
In order to have an explicit solution, we also need to impose that δ1 = δ2 =
1. The assumption of 100% depreciation of both capital goods is not realistic
and should be abandoned when it comes to simulation. For the theoretical
purpose here, the assumption helps us to draw qualitative conclusions.
Under laissez-faire, formation of both type 1 and type 2 capital is done by
private individuals. The government plays no role. As explained in Kehoe,
Levine and Romer (1992), the competitive equilibrium allocation is the result










t)1−α−β − ct − zt
k2
t+1 = zt.










The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
1/ct = λt (2)















1−α − ct − k
2
t+1. (6)
The transversality conditions are: ρtλtk1
t+1 → 0a n dρtµtk2
t+1 → 0a s
t →∞ . Note that in equation (6), the equilibrium condition k2
t = ˆ k2
t has
been substituted in.
We guess that the solution to the above equations has the following form:
k
1
t+1 = ayt, k
2
t+1 = byt and ct =( 1− a − b)yt with a and b constant.
It is straightforward to verify that when a = ρα,b= ρβ,t h eg u e s sa b o v e
satisﬁes all the ﬁrst-order conditions and the transversality conditions and







Thus the rate of output growth in the benchmark case is
g0 = ρAα
αβ
1−α − 1. (8)
Note that k1
t+1 = ραyt and k2
t+1 = ρβyt. It is clear that an increase in α raises
next period type 1 capital for any given current output; an increase in β raises
next period type 2 capital for any given current output. However, from the
growth rate formula (8), g0 increases in β while the eﬀect of an increase in
7α is ambiguous. The explanation for this is that β does not appear in the
production function at the equilibrium whereas α has an ambiguous eﬀect
on output since yt+1 = A(k1
t+1)α(k2
t+1)1−α. Equation (8) also says that the
growth rate is increasing in ρ and A. This is intuitive because an increase in
ρ means that individuals discount future utility to a lesser extent and thus
would save more and the economy would grow faster; an increase in A means
that productivity is higher and therefore the growth rate is higher.
Under laissez-faire, since the positive externality from type 2 capital stock
is not internalized, private individuals will invest in this type of capital less
than the socially optimal amount. This is one of the popular arguments for
government action. In the next section, we study the costs and beneﬁts of
diﬀerent types of government intervention to internalize the externality.
4C o s t s a n d B e n e ﬁts of Government Inter-
vention
In the last section, we reiterated the conventional wisdom that laissez-faire
leads to under-investment in the presence of positive externality. The popular
actions that the government takes in this circumstance are: (1) Take over
type 2 capital formation, providing it publicly; and (2) Subsidize type 2
capital formation by the private sector. When lump-sum taxes are available
to the government, actions (1) and (2) can both restore the social optimum.
In this case, it is straightforward to derive that in equilibrium, k1
t+1 = ραyt,
k2
t+1 = ρ(1 − α)yt and the rate of output growth is ρAαα(1 − α)1−α − 1.
8But what if lump-sum taxes are not available and the government has to
use distortionary taxes? Several issues arise. First, given the tax distortions,
is it worthwhile for the government to take any action? Second, which of
the two actions — public provision or a subsidy — is more desirable from the
social-welfare point of view?
We now analyze the two actions. To simplify matters, we limit our anal-
ysis to constant tax/subsidy rates.
4.1 Action 1: Public Capital Formation by Output Tax
The setup is as follows. The government announces that a tax rate τ will be
levied on output and all the tax proceeds spent on type 2 capital formation
for public use. Private individuals then respond optimally to the announced
government policy and decide how much to consume and how much to save
for type 1 capital investment. Finally, the government takes the individuals’
response as given to maximize the representative individual’s welfare.









t)1−α(1 − τ) − ct
where ˜ k2
t and τ are controlled by the government and are taken as given by




















9The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
1/ct = γt (10)
γt = ργt+1α(1 − τ)yt+1/k
1
t+1 (11)
The transversality condition is: ρtγtk1
t+1 → 0a st →∞ . Note that all
government tax revenue is assumed to be spent on type 2 capital formation.
Thus we have: ˜ k2
t+1 = τyt.
It is easy to verify that the individual’s optimal response is the following:
k
1
t+1 = ρα(1 − τ)yt (12)
ct =[ 1 − ρα(1 − τ) − τ]yt (13)





1−α − 1. (14)
To ﬁnd the optimal tax rate, we ﬁrst calculate the individual’s welfare
as a function of τ, W(τ). This can be done explicitly because equation (13)
says that consumption starts from c0(τ) and grows at a constant rate g(τ),






(1 − ρ)2 [αln(1 − τ)+( 1− α)lnτ] (15)
where Γ is independent of τ.S e t t i n gW 0(τ) = 0, we get the optimal tax rate:
τ
∗
1 = ρ(1 − α) (16)
and the resulting growth rate:
g1 = ρAα
α(1 − α)
1−α [1 − ρ(1 − α)]
α − 1 (17)
10It is worth noting that the optimal tax rate derived here is consistent with
the one found in Glomm and Ravikumar (1994). Similar to Barro (1990),
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) assume that infrastructure is provided by the
government and then ask what the optimal tax rate should be. We in this
paper raise the question of whether infrastructure should be provided by the
government. The answer to this question is deferred to section 5 where we
compare growth rates and welfare in various cases.
4.2 Action 2: Investment Subsidy Financed by Output
Tax
This is the case in which the government intervenes indirectly through in-
centive schemes instead of directly taking over type 2 capital formation. We
represent the government’s action by two constant rates s and τ,w h e r es
is the subsidy rate to private type 2 capital formation and τ is the output
tax rate. We assume that the government budget is balanced in each period.
To ensure a balanced budget, the two rates must satisfy a simple relation:
τ = ρβs/(1 + ρβs). This says that when the subsidy rate s is zero (the
laissez-faire case), the tax rate needed to ﬁnance the subsidy is obviously
zero; when s increases without bound, τ increases and approaches unity. We
will verify later that this relation does guarantee a balanced budget.
The above discussion means that the government’s action can be rep-
resented by the subsidy rate s alone. When s is given, the required τ is
determined by ρβs/(1 + ρβs). With this in mind, we raise two questions.
F i r s t ,w i l lw e l f a r ei n c r e a s ew h e nw em o v ef r o ms = 0 (the laissez-faire case)
11to a slightly positive s? In other words, does intervention pay? Second, what
is the optimal subsidy rate s∗ that leads to the highest welfare among all
possible subsidy rates?
To answer these questions, we form and solve the representative indi-
vidual’s optimization problem. Each individual takes s and τ as given. He
also takes other individuals’ actions as given. Since we assume there are
an inﬁnite number of individuals, no individual has control over {ˆ k2
t}t=∞
t=0 ,
the average of type 2 capital in the economy. The individual’s optimization










t)1−α−β(1 − τ) − ct − zt
k2
t+1 = zt(1 + s),
where ct and zt (investment on type 2 capital) are the control variables; k1
t
and k2
t are the state variables.
The optimal decision by the representative agent can be summarized by
the following results:
k1
t+1 = ρα(1 − τ)yt
k2
t+1 = ρβ(1 + s)(1 − τ)yt
zt = ρβ(1 − τ)yt.
It is straightforward to verify that for s and τ that satisfy τ = ρβs/(1+ρβs),
the government budget is always balanced:
szt − τyt = sρβ[1 − ρβs/(1 + ρβs)]yt − [ρβs/(1 + ρβs)]yt ≡ 0.
12Given the optimal decision of the representative agent, we can easily calculate
his welfare as a function of the subsidy rate s. To proceed, we note that,









= ρAααβ1−α(1 + s)1−αyt/(1 + ρβs)
≡ [1 + g(s)]yt,
w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o ng(s) to denote the growth rate of output when
the subsidy rate is s.S i n c e ct is proportional to yt, the growth rate of
consumption is equal to g(s). Hence the consumption series starts with
c0(s)=( 1− ρα − ρβ)y0/(1 + ρβs)a n dg r o w sa tt h er a t eg(s). As a result,
welfare as a function of s can be calculated:
W(s)=J +
ρ(1 − α)
(1 − ρ)2 ln(1 + s) −
1
(1 − ρ)2 ln(1 + ρβs), (18)
where J is a constant and is independent of the subsidy rate. We now answer
the questions raised above in two propositions.
Proposition 1: Welfare increases when s increases from zero (the laissez-
faire case) to a slightly positive rate. That is, W 0(0) > 0.
Proof. From equation (18), we obtain
W
0(s)=
ρ(1 − α − β) − [1 − ρ(1 − α)]ρβs
(1 − ρ)2(1 + ρβs)(1 + s)
. (19)
Thus, W 0(0) = ρ(1 − α − β)/(1 − ρ)2 > 0.
13Proposition 2: The optimal rate of subsidy is given by
s
∗ =
1 − α − β
β[1 − ρ(1 − α)]
. (20)




     
     
+0 ≤ s<s ∗
0 s = s∗
− s>s ∗
where s∗ i sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 2 0 ) . T h u sW(s) is maximized at s∗.T h e




ρ(1 − α − β)
1 − ρβ
which is seen to lie in the open interval (0,1).
Propositions 1 and 2 have two implications for policy based on welfare
considerations. First, the government can improve upon laissez-faire by sub-
sidizing public capital formation. Second, government intervention should
not be overdone; when the subsidy rate is greater than s∗, welfare starts to
decline.
When the government subsidizes type 2 capital formation at the rate s∗
and ﬁnances it by an output tax at the rate τ∗
2, the equilibrium levels of











t+1 = ρ(1 − α)yt, (22)









14Equation (23) will be used for comparison with other growth rates.
5 C o m p a r i s o no fG r o w t hR a t e sa n dW e l f a r e
In this section, we provide two propositions. Proposition 3 compares growth
rates and Proposition 4 compares welfare.
Proposition 3: Among the growth rates in the laissez-faire case and in the
subsequent cases with government intervention, we have
g1 <g 2
g0 <g 2
Proof. From equations (17) and (23), we see that g1 <g 2. To show that
















It is straightforward to show that Φ(x)i si n c r e a s i n gi nx when 0 <x<
(1 − α)/ρ. Note that 0 < β < 1 − α < (1 − α)/ρ. It must be true that







The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. To begin with, it is
natural that g2 is greater than g1 because in taking action 2, the government
15needs less of the distortionary tax to ﬁnance the investment subsidy than
in taking action 1 where all of public capital formation has to be ﬁnanced.
The result that g2 is always greater than g0 says that the beneﬁtf r o ma n
investment subsidy to correct for the externality is always greater than the
cost of ﬁnancing the subsidy through an output tax. The reason for this stems
from Proposition 1, which stated that starting from zero, a small subsidy will
improve welfare (it will also increase the growth rate). But a subsidy of zero
is the laissez-faire equilibrium. Thus, we can always improve welfare and the
growth rate (relative to the laissez-faire case) by increasing the subsidy from
zero to its optimal amount.
What Proposition 3 leaves out is the comparison between g1 and g0.W e








[1 − ρ(1 − α)]
α. (25)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side, which is greater than 1, captures the
beneﬁt of internalizing the positive externality; the second term, which is less
than 1, captures the cost of the distortionary output tax that is imposed in
order to ﬁnance the public capital formation.
When α approaches zero, (1 + g1)/(1 + g0) approaches 1/β, which is
greater than 1. The net eﬀect of public capital formation is clearly favorable
to long-run growth. This occurs because with a small α, type 1 capital is
unimportant. The tax distortion on type 1 capital formation is thus not very
costly. The beneﬁt from internalizing the positive externality dominates the
outcome.
When (1 − α)i sc l o s et oβ, the ﬁrst term is close to 1 and the second
16term is close to [1−ρβ]1−β. Therefore the cost dominates the beneﬁt. When
(1 − α)i sc l o s et oβ,1− α − β is close to zero. The externality in the
production function is hardly signiﬁcant and hence not worth internalizing.
The greater is ρ, the less people discount the future. The accumulation
of both types of capital, and type 2 capital in particular, will be faster. This
requires a greater tax burden and the cost from tax distortion becomes more
severe. Therefore, the net beneﬁt from public capital formation tends to be
lower with a greater ρ. This intuition is conﬁrmed in equation (25).
Proposition 4: Among the representative individual’s welfare achieved




Proof: W0 <W 2 was established in Propositions 1 and 2. As for W1
and W2, they can be calculated as follows. First, note that from (13) and
(16), we have
c1(0) = {1 − ρα[1 − ρ(1 − α)] − ρ(1 − α)}y(0) (26)





1 − ρ(1 − α)
1 − ρβ
#
− ρ(1 − α)
)
y(0) (27)
Also, the growth rates are given explicitly in (17) and (23). With this infor-
mation, the computation of W1 and W2 is straightforward and we ﬁnd
sgn(W2 − W1)=s g n Ψ(β),
17where Ψ(β)=( 1 −ρ)ln(1− ρα − ρβ)−(1−ρ)ln(1−ρα)−[1 − ρ(1 − α)]ln(1−
ρβ). We now show that Ψ(β) > 0, recalling that β ∈ (0,1−α). First, we see
that limΨ(β)=0a sβ → 0+. Second, we calculate Ψ0(β)a n dﬁnd
sgnΨ
0(β)=s g n( 1− α − β).
Thus, Ψ0(β) > 0 for any β ∈ (0, 1 − α).
While the intuition behind W1 <W 2 is the same as that for the compar-
ison of the two growth rates, note that the initial consumption under action
1i shigher than under action 2. Thus, it must be the case that the two con-
sumption paths cross, and that the higher initial consumption under action
1 is dominated by the higher long-run consumption under action 2. As for
the comparison between W0 and W1, we again have an ambiguous result.
When the private return to type 2 capital is small (β close to zero), simple
calculation shows that W0 is less than W1. Thus direct provision of type 2
capital is better than laissez-faire. When β approaches 1 − α,w eﬁnd that
sgn(W1 − W0)=s g n [ Ω(α,ρ)]
where, Ω(α,ρ)=ρln[1 − ρ(1 − α)]
α +( 1− ρ)ln
(1 − ρα)[1 − ρ(1 − α)]
1 − ρ
≤ ln{ρ[1 − ρ(1 − α)]
α +( 1− ρα)[1 − ρ(1 − α)]}
< ln{ρ[1 − αρ(1 − α)] + (1 − ρα)[1 − ρ(1 − α)]}
=0
in which the ﬁrst inequality is due to the fact that ln(·) is concave; the second
inequality is because (1−x)α < 1−αx for α ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1). Therefore,
18when β approaches 1−α, W1 is less than W0. This result is intuitive because
in this case, the externality is so small that the beneﬁt from internalizing the
externality is negligible compared to the cost of the tax distortion.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we attempted to combine two ideas arising from the literature
on endogenous growth. One is that there are positive externalities associated
with stocks, which if internalized can increase the economy’s long-run growth
rate. The other is that in order to intervene and internalize these externali-
ties, governments have to resort to distortionary taxes. Using a simple model,
we showed that the manner in which the government intervenes makes a big
diﬀerence to whether the intervention is beneﬁcial or not. Speciﬁcally, we
showed that if the government provides the public capital stock, the resulting
growth rate and welfare may not be superior to those when the government
does nothing (laissez-faire). By contrast, if the government subsidizes private
provision of public capital, the long-run growth rate and welfare will always
dominate both the public-provision and laissez-faire cases.
While the model used to derive these results was highly simpliﬁed, the
basic messages are quite robust. The normative lesson is that governments
should always consider the option of subsidization before public provision
when intervening to correct an externality. Even under the extreme assump-
tion that the public sector is as eﬃcient as the private sector, the costs
of ﬁnancing public programs through distortionary taxes may outweigh the
beneﬁts of internalizing the positive externality. The positive lesson is that
19government spending could be growth-enhancing in one country but growth-
impeding in another, because of the relative importance of distortionary tax-
ation and the externality being internalized. In fact, this idea may be part
of the explanation of why empirical estimates of the Barro-type endogenous
growth model have produced a wide range of results (see, for example, As-
chauer 1989, King and Rebelo 1990, Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 1993 and
Easterly and Rebelo 1993).
Needless to say, the model in this paper can be enriched in several ways.
For instance, it could be extended to include congestion eﬀects in the use of
the public capital stock. A wider array of instruments could be considered.
For example, if the public capital stock is knowledge, then the government
could consider patent policy as another option. Finally, some of the assump-
tions about functional forms could be relaxed. Simulation analysis would
then permit us to characterize not just the long-run growth rate, but the
transitional dynamics as well.
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